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in industry. A similar result was reached in Lincoln Candies v. Department of
Labor' where the setting of minimum hours per week for women was held
constitutional as a means to effectuate the policy of article 19 of the Labor Law.
42
Since this statute is not unconstitutional on its face, the only issue remaining
is whether it is unconstitutional in its appIcation to plaintiff. The Court of
Appeals refused to decde this issue because the plaintiff had not exhausted his
remedies under the act. Section 66 2 4a allows matters of law to be reviewed by the
Board of Standards and Appeals as provided in §11044 which states that matters
of validity and reasonableness shall be proper for that Board's review. Thereafter
appeals from that determination can be taken direct to the Appellate Division,
third Department. Due to the plaintiff's failure to seek relief under these sections
before appealing to the Court of Appeals, that body followed the well-established
rule that constitutional issues will not be decided unless there are no other
grounds on which to disposes of the case in controversy.4 1
The dissent would have decided the constitutional question as to application
in favor of the plaintiff in this instance instead of relegating him to his remedy
under the statute.
In the light of the prevailing doctrine in the federal as well as the state
courts to avoid constitutional issues if possible,4" the majority's approach to this
problem is the more acceptible.
Invoking Privilege Againsf Self Incriminaion-Grounds For Discharge
A controversial area of law today is the extent of the protection given by
the courts to a party who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination.
Although the basic merits of the privilege have been questioned,4 7 the right seems
firmly entrenched in our legal system.48 Dean Griswold has called it "one of the
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized."
49
Due process considerations were present in Lerner v. Casey,00 where petitioner
41. 289 N.Y. 262, 45 N.E.2d 434 (1942).
42. See note 35 supra.
43. See note 39 supra.
44. N.Y. LABOR LAw §110.
45. Schieffelin v. Goldsmith, 253 N.Y. 243, 170 N.E. 905 (1930); O'Kane v.
State, 283 N.Y. 439, 28 N.E.2d 905 (1940).
46. Ibid; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Drisco]l v. Edison
Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1938).
47. 74 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1925). For a discussion of the privileges against
self-incrimination, see 6 BUFFALO L. Rsv. 343 (1957).
48. 24 FORDHAM' L. REV. 19 (1955); see Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225
(1st Cir. 1954).
49. GRISWOLD. THiE FiTE AmENDMTENT TODAY, 7 (1955).
50. 2 N.Y.2d 355, 161 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1957).
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sought to compel the New York Transit Authority to reinstate him in his position
as a conductor in the subway system of New York City. In an appearance before
the commissioner of investigation of New York City, petitioner refused to answer
the question whether or not he was then a communist, on the ground that the
answer might tend to incriminate him. He persisted in his refusal, even after
being advised of the provisions of the Security Risk Law,51 under which provisions
he was subsequently discharged. The sole ground for his discharge was that he
had invoked the fourteenth amendment.
The majority of the Court, in affirming a denial of the petition, agreed that
the New York Transit Authority was a "governmental agency" within the terms
of the Security Risk Law, and that the transit authority was properly designated a
security agency under said statute. The Court also held that the invocation of the
fourteenth amendment was sufficient reason, that is, reasonable grounds, for
discharge. A distinction was drawn that the petitioner's dismissal was not due to
any possible communist membership, but rather such conduct of using the
privilege against self-incrimination was in itself evidence of doubtful trust and
reliability so as to constitute sufficient grounds for petitioners discharge.
In upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the Court found it necessary
to distinguish the recent Supreme Court decision of Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education.2 In that decision, state action in dismissing a teacher from his position
and basing such dismissal on the ground that he invoked the self-incrimination
privilege, was declared unconstitutional. Slochower had invoked it before a
Federal Committee twelve years before his dismissal by the State of New York.
The Court in the instant decision found the time period not remote, and also
stated that under the Security Risk Law, petitioner was provided an opportunity
to explain his use of the privilege against self-incrimination, while in the
Slochower decision, no explanaton for this conduct was available, and that in the
instant case petitioner was discharged for creating a "doubt" as to his truthworth-
iness and reliability.
5 3
The importance of the New York Transit system is easily recognized,5 4 for it
would be a primary means of exodus in case of enemy attack. Any possible conduct
by petitioner to hinder the proper operation of the system in case of emergency
was also noted. Yet, taking these facts into consideration, the Court does not
adequately explain 'vhy the mere refusal to answer a question on the grounds of
self-incrimination, was sufficient evidence to establish petitioner's lack of trust-
51. 2 McK., UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS §§1101-08.
52. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
53. NEw YORK CITY CHARTER §903 (1956).
54. See New York City Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc.2d 733, 738, 154
N.Y.S.2d 209, 214 (Sup. Ct. 1956). For a related topic, see Gardner v. Board of
Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1950).
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worthiness. In the Slochower opinion, the Supreme Court asserted that the
"invocation of the privilege ...would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its
exercise would be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or conclusive
presumption of perjury." The Court of Appeals, declared that the raising of the
privilege is evidence of doubtful trust which is the basis of discharge, and not
the invocation of the fourteenth amendment. The validity of this semantic
distinction will soon be tested, since this decision now rests on the docket of the
Supreme Court. Dismissal based solely upon the invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination presents a grave constitutional problem involving the
scope and reach of the due process clause.
Civil Righs-Discrimination In Public Places
Under section 40 of the Civil Rights Law, no person can be excluded from
places of public accommodation, resort, or amusement because of race, color,
creed, or place of national origin. This restriction does not apply, however, to
institutions, clubs, or places of accommodation that are distinctly private. Two
questions thus arise when an individual is denied access to a certain establishment.
Was such access refused because of the individual's race, color, creed, or place of
national origin? Was the establishment public as distinguished from private?
Affirmative answers to these questions in a certain situation clearly demonstrate
a violation of the Civil Rights Act. Such a conclusion was reached by the Court
of Appeals in Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury55 in affirming the order of the
Appellate Division.
In this case, the Castle Hill Beach Club, a membership corporation, refused
to sell to Mrs. Brown, a negro, season locker rights which would have entitled her
to use beach facilities. The Court of Appeals easily determined that the denial
of access to Mrs. Brown was solely because of her color. The real problem was
determining whether the Beach Club was a private or public amusement.
The Court's conclusion that the Beach Club was public leaves us with the
problem of how to distinguish between public and private establishments.
Generally it can be stated that public and private characteristics of a place of
amusement will be considered in their overall effect giving greater weight to
those features to which the public attention has been drawn. Whichever features
are predominant will determine the nature of the amusement facilities. 0 Moreover,
if the predominant purpose of creating private characteristics is to avoid the effect
of the Civil Rights Act, the court will probably feel more prone to label the
facilities public. This distinction is not entirely satisfactory as it leaves much to
55. 2 N.Y.2d 596, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
56. Cf. Delaney v. Central Valley Golf Club, 28 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1941), aif'd,
263 App. Div. 710, 31 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1st Dep't 1941), uppeal denied 263 App. Div.
870, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd, 289 N.Y. 577, 43 N.E.2d 716 (1942).
